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I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article addresses the question of whether lying to suspects during 
interrogations regarding the incriminating evidence against them is a 
legitimate deceit. The search for truth goes hand-in-hand with the human
yearning for knowledge.1 Generally, lying is perceived as reprehensible. 
Certain types of lies, such as those concerning medical treatment or the 
sale of a house, may even result in civil or criminal liability.2  Despite the 
condemnation of lying, lying to suspects during interrogations is a common 
phenomenon, and has even been dubbed an “art.”3 
Part II of the article presents how police use deceit and lies during
interrogations in general, as well as lies relating to the existence and strength 
of incriminating evidence, and describes their alleged justifications.  Part 
III seeks to refute these justifications, and it turns to normative arguments
for imposing a prohibition on lies concerning the incriminating evidence 
against suspects. The article argues in this third part that lies of this type 
are illegitimate because they create an increased risk of false confessions 
and because they force suspects in general, and innocent suspects in particular, 
to shape their defense in view of false evidence.  Consequently, lies infringe
upon fundamental principles of constitutional criminal law, such as the 
right to remain silent, the presumption of innocence, and the imposition 
of the obligation to prove the accusations on the prosecution.  Alongside
normative arguments, the article addresses empirical laboratory studies, which
show the success of lies to induce false confessions and demonstrate that
every type of lie concerning incriminating evidence carries a risk of such
confession. All the arguments against using lies ultimately revolve around 
the linkage between lies and the requirement imposed on the state to shoulder
the obligation of proving guilt.  Finally, Part IV concludes. 
1. Eugene R. Milhizer, Rethinking Police Interrogation: Encouraging Reliable
Confessions While Respecting Suspects’ Dignity, 41 Val. U. L. Rev. 1, 59–63 (2006). 
2. Deborah Young, Unnecessary Evil: Police Lying in Interrogations, 28 CONN.
L. REV. 425, 469 (1996). 
3. Christopher Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery: Investigative Lies by the 
Police, 76 OR. L. REV. 775, 784 (1997) [hereinafter Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery];
Young, supra note 2, at 459. 
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A. Using Deceit and Lies 
Deceit is a standard method of police interrogations.4  It replaced, in 
practice, the use of violence as a means of extracting confessions.5 
Courts consider the use of deceit in interrogations legitimate.6  As Justice
Lamer in Canada put it:
The investigation of crime and the detection of criminals is not a game to be
governed by the Marquess of Queensbury rules.  The authorities, in dealing with
shrewd and often sophisticated criminals, must sometimes of necessity resort to
tricks or other forms of deceit and should not through the rule be hampered in
their work.7 
Scholars rest their claim that investigative deceit is justified on its effectiveness 
in discovering the truth and enforcing the law.8  Proponents of deceit stress 
that guilty suspects normally do not act contrary to their own interest by
 4. See Barry C. Feld, Police Interrogation of Juveniles: An Empirical Study of 
Policy and Practice, 97 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 219, 221 (2006); Brian R. Gallini,
Police “Science” in the Interrogation Room: Seventy Years of Pseudo-Psychological
Interrogation Methods to Obtain Inadmissible Confessions, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 529, 530, 
546, 548–53 (2010); Miriam S. Gohara, A Lie for a Lie: False Confessions and the Case 
for Reconsidering the Legality of Deceptive Interrogation Techniques, 33 FORDHAM URB.
L.J. 791, 792 (2006); Laurie Magid, Deceptive Police Interrogation Practices: How Far is
Too Far?, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1168, 1168 (2001) [hereinafter Magid, Deceptive Police];
Meghan Morris, The Decision Zone: The New Stage of Interrogation Created by Berghuis 
v. Thompkins, 39 AM. J. CRIM. L. 271, 277 (2012); Jerome H. Skolnick & Richard A. Leo, 
The Ethics of Deceptive Interrogation, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Winter/Spring 1992, at 3;
Welsh S. White, Police Trickery in Inducing Confessions, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 581, 581–82 
(1979) [hereinafter White, Police Trickery]; Irina Khasin, Note, Honesty Is the Best
Policy: A Case for the Limitation of Deceptive Police Interrogation Practices in the United 
States, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1029, 1030 (2009); Lisa Patrice Taylor, Note, Illinois 
v. Perkins: Balancing the Need for Effective Law Enforcement Against a Suspect’s 
Constitutional Rights, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 989, 1025 (1991). 
5. Khasin, supra note 4, at 1036; see also Alberto B. Lopez, $10 and a Denim Jacket?
A Model Statute for Compensating the Wrongly Convicted, 36 GA. L. REV. 665, 682 (2002) 
(noting that the high value of confession creates an incentive for the police to use deceit).
 6. Elizabeth N. Jones, The Good and (Breaking) Bad of Deceptive Police Practices, 
45 N.M. L. REV. 523, 523 (2015); Paul Marcus, It’s Not Just About Miranda: Determining 
the Voluntariness of Confessions in Criminal Prosecutions, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 601, 612
(2006); Tracy Lamar Wright, Comment, Let’s Take Another Look at That: False Confession, 
Interrogation, and the Case for Electronic Recording, 44 IDAHO L. REV. 251, 261–62 (2007). 
7.  R. v. Oickle, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, para. 66 (Can.). 
8. Magid, Deceptive Police, supra note 4, at 1197–98. 
 613


















   
   
 
      
    
 
 
   
   
      
     
    
       
  
    
   
     
   
 
confessing.9  Society is not indifferent to the outcome of the investigation,
and it is interested in obtaining a true account of events from the suspect.10 
The main role of the police is to solve crimes.  The public’s expectation 
of the police is to fulfill this role successfully.  To this end, society must
equip interrogators with effective tools to discover the truth, including the 
use of deceit.11 
Scholars argue that absolute honesty is not practical even in the course 
of routine business negotiations because every negotiator naturally wishes
that the other side think as highly of the negotiator’s goods as he does.12 
A fortiori, absolute honesty is not warranted in an interrogation, in the course
of which the interrogator is trying to obtain the necessary information “on 
the cheap,” that is, without investing excessive resources and without 
significant compromise on the content of the accusations.  Interrogators 
have the character of a “war of minds” between the interrogator and the 
suspect, with each side trying to prevail upon the other in ingenuity and 
creativity, while deceit helps overcome the resistance of suspects. 
Roughly speaking, lies are a type of deceit.13  Some lies during interrogation 
may take the form of a different category of misconduct, such as an
interrogator threatening “if you don’t confess your guilt, you will remain
in custody for a long time and your children will be taken away from you”; 
or threatening to arrest a loved one without a basis of probable cause for 
such a detention; or tempting a suspect by offering “if you confess, you 
will be released immediately.” 
Other lies are distinct and cannot be included with other forms of
misconduct.  During interrogation, interrogators use many types of lies.
They fake sympathy for the suspect and persuade him that they are interested
in his welfare in order to buy his friendship and establish rapport.14 They
may use the tactic of minimization, which conveys a message to the suspect 
9. See JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 31–33 (1993); HAROLD
J. ROTHWAX, GUILTY: THE COLLAPSE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 81 (1996).
10. Magid, Deceptive Police, supra note 4, at 1180. 
11. Id. at 1172. 
 12. David Geronemus, Lies, Damn Lies and Unethical Lies: How to Negotiate Ethically 
and Effectively, BUS. L. TODAY, May/June 1997, at 11, 11–12 (1997). 
13. However, deceit and lies are different in some respects. See SEANA VALENTINE
SHIFFRIN, SPEECH MATTERS: ON LYING, MORALITY, AND THE LAW 13–15 (2014) (explaining 
that lies do not necessarily require the recipient to be deceived and offering the pathological liar
as an example of when lying decouples from deception). 
14. See GRANO,supra note 9, at 112; Fred E. Inbau, Police Interrogation—A Practical
Necessity, in POLICE POWER AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM 147, 151 (Claude R. Sowle ed., 1962); 
Laurie Magid, The Miranda Debate: Questions Past, Present, and Future, 36 HOUS. L.
REV. 1251, 1259–60 (1999) [hereinafter Magid, Questions Past]; Morris, supra note 4, at 
290; Margaret L. Paris, Trust, Lies, and Interrogation, 3 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 3, 21–23
(1995) [hereinafter Paris, Trust, Lies, and Interrogation]; Skolnick & Leo, supra note 4,
at 6; Khasin, supra note 4, at 1038. 
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that downplays his fault, and implicitly, the severity of the consequences 
of the confession and the guilt associated with the offense.15  For instance, 
the interrogator may assert that the victim bears the brunt of the blame for 
the offense—by seducing the suspect into having sexual intercourse or 
attacking him and causing him to respond; may blame the suspect’s 
accomplice, who is more experienced than he; or point to conditions of life 
in general as responsible for the offense.16  The suspect is relieved upon 
believing that many people would have acted the way he did under similar 
circumstances.17  The minimization tactic, which suggests to the suspect 
that his act is less serious than it is deemed, can be perceived as an implied
promise of leniency.18 
Lies relating to misrepresentation of the incriminating evidence against 
the suspect are part of a maximization tactic, designed to create a false 
impression for the suspect and to use the severity of the consequences to
intimidate her if she does not confess guilt.19  Other tactics of maximization,
in addition to lies about the existence and strength of incriminating
evidence, are interrogating the suspect using a more serious offense, or 
exaggerating the severity of her offense, by for example accusing the suspect 
of stealing a larger amount than the amount actually taken, or exaggerating 
the harm caused to the victim of the offense.20 
Even without pointing to a certain type of lie, some argue that using lies 
is an integral part of interrogations, because often interrogators try to
 15. See Feld, supra note 4, at 277–78; Gohara, supra note 4, at 821; Peter Kageleiry,
Jr., Psychological Police Interrogation Methods: Pseudoscience in the Interrogation
Room Obscures Justice in the Courtroom, 193 MIL. L. REV. 1, 41 (2007) (quoting Saul M. 
Kassin & Karlyn McNall, Police Interrogations and Confessions: Communicating Promises
and Threats by Pragmatic Implication, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 233, 247 (1991)); Saul 
M. Kassin & Katherine L. Kiechel, The Social Psychology of False Confessions: Compliance, 
Internalization, and Confabulation, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 125, 125 (1996); Paris, Trust, Lies,
and Interrogation, supra note 14, at 20–21; David L. Sterling, Police Interrogation and the 
Psychology of Confession, 14 J. PUB. L. 25, 40 (1965). 
16. See JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE 89 (2000); Gallini, supra note 4, at 
539–40; Kageleiry, Jr., supra note 15, at 13; Skolnick & Leo, supra note 4, at 6; Sterling,
supra note 15, at 39–40; Young, supra note 2, at 430–31; Khasin, supra note 4, at 1039. 
17. See Young, supra note 2, at 430–31; Khasin, supra note 4, at 1039. 
18. See Saul M. Kassin, On the Psychology of Confessions: Does Innocence Put
Innocents at Risk?, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 215, 222 (2005) [hereinafter Kassin, Psychology of 
Confessions]; Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and 
Recommendations, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 18 (2010) [hereinafter Kassin et al., Police-
Induced Confessions]; Kassin & Kiechel, supra note 15, at 125. 
19. Feld, supra note 4, at 261; Kageleiry, Jr., supra note 15, at 41. 
20.  Skolnick & Leo, supra note 4, at 7. 
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convince suspects that it is beneficial for them to admit guilt, although
confessing may lead to conviction and punishment.21  Interrogators must 
deceive suspects in some way into taking an action that is devastating or
irrational, like confessing guilt.22  Complete honesty would require the
interrogator to advise the suspect to avoid confessing and to consult with
an attorney before making a statement.23  Such an honest interrogator is
unlikely to obtain confessions.24  According to this line of thought, a ban
on lying to reduce a suspect’s ability to understand the consequences of
the confession is tantamount to a prohibition on police interrogation, because
every interrogator tries to achieve that exact objective.25  The need to establish 
the suspect’s rapport inevitably involves lies in the interrogation room.26 
Furthermore, lies and deception are not unique to interrogations. Some
claim that all people lie and mislead daily.27  Lies and deception are part 
of the routine of life.28  Many smile kindly to people they loathe, creating
a false impression of friendship.29  If we tell the truth to everyone, it is likely
that our popularity would not soar very high.  Given existing conventions,
it is difficult to prohibit a lie that is reflected in a smile and gestures of
friendship toward the suspect, such as offering a cup of coffee or a cigarette, 
even though such gestures do not reflect the true feelings of the interrogator
toward the suspect, and are aimed solely at reducing his awareness of the
adversarial relationship with the interrogator.30  Polite gestures are not
 21. Morris, supra note 4, at 287; Paris, Trust, Lies, and Interrogation, supra note 
14, at 18; William J. Stuntz, Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering, 79 VA. L. REV.
1903, 1921 (1993) [hereinafter Stuntz, Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering].
22. See Gordon Van Kessel, Quieting the Guilty and Acquitting the Innocent: A
Close Look at a New Twist on the Right to Silence, 35 IND. L. REV. 925, 981 (2002) (calling 
modern interrogations a “confidence game”).  Indeed, suspects can confess for rational
reasons and for the purpose of clearing their consciences.  William J. Stuntz, Miranda’s 
Mistake, 99 MICH. L. REV. 975, 987 (2001).  However, one may wonder how the scruples 
disappear at the trial itself, when the defendant—who confessed during interrogation—
denies guilt.  At any rate, confessions that are motivated by the will to clear the conscience
are rare. See Scott W. Howe, Moving Beyond Miranda: Concessions for Confessions, 110 
NW. U. L. REV. 905, 924 (2016). 
23. Magid, Deceptive Police, supra note 4, at 1198–99. 
24. Id. at 1199. 
25. Id. at 1205. 
26. Khasin, supra note 4, at 1056. 
27. Magid, Deceptive Police, supra note 4, at 1184. 
28. Deborah Bradford & Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Detecting Deception in Police
Investigations: Implications for False Confessions, 15 PSYCHIATRY, PSYCHOL. & L. 105, 
105 (2008); Stuntz, Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering, supra note 21, at 1910. 
29. See also Paul Butler, An Ethos of Lying, 8 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 269, 269 (2004) 
(stating in a different context: “To be polite, I laughed, although actually I thought the jokes
were tired.  My laugh was a lie.”). 
30. This is the case even though when the suspect has a strong need for social
recognition, sympathy on the part of the interrogator might cause the suspect to make a 
616
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necessarily lies.31  Treating a friendly smile directed at an opponent as a 
lie ascribes too broad a meaning to lies and thereby weakens the immorality
inherent in lying.32  Even if such gestures are treated as lies, they are not 
necessarily ethically unacceptable.  Creating a safe and friendly atmosphere 
does not cause normal, innocent suspect to confess and certainly does not 
create a sense of helplessness or hopelessness.33 
But even if we accept the assumption that an interrogation inherently
involves some lies, it does not justify every type of lie.34  Although some
scholars like Kant consider telling the truth to be an absolute moral
principle,35 the prevailing view holds that lies are justifiable in certain 
circumstances,36 and that prohibition on lying may conflict with other
moral values.37  It appears that a reasonable person would find it difficult
to condemn a lie told by a hostage in a situation of self-defense that he is 
armed with a gun.  Although the general issue of lying is beyond the scope 
of this Article, general justifications for lying may also be partly valid during 
interrogations.  Some allege that lying to suspects in interrogations may
be justified for utilitarian reasons.38  In situations of crisis, such as kidnapping, 
it is customary to justify lies aimed at preventing harm to others and 
saving innocent lives.39  It is possible to think of other situations of crisis,
false confession.  Gary Hamblet, Note, Deceptive Interrogation Techniques and the 
Relinquishment of Constitutional Rights, 10 RUTGERS-CAMDEN L.J. 109, 143 (1978). 
31. See generally THOMAS L. CARSON, LYING AND DECEPTION: THEORY AND PRACTICE
259 (2010). 
32. At the same time, a situation in which a person who speaks ill of another behind
his back but praises him to his face is perceived as a lie. Id. at 261. 
33. Khasin, supra note 4, at 1039. 
34. James G. Thomas, Note, Police Use of Trickery as an Interrogation Technique, 
32 VAND. L. REV. 1167, 1190 (1979). 
35. See Immanuel Kant, On a Supposed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives (1797),
reprinted in ABSOLUTISM AND ITS CONSEQUENTIALIST CRITICS 15, 15–19 (Joram Graf 
Haber ed., 1994); see also SAINT AUGUSTINE, Against Lying, reprinted in TREATISES ON
VARIOUS SUBJECTS 125, 125–29, 171–74 (Roy J. Deferrari ed., Harold B. Jaffee trans., 1952). 
36. See SISSELA BOK, LYING: MORAL CHOICE IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE LIFE 39–42 
(1978); Butler, supra note 29, at 269; Mark C. Murphy, Natural Law and the Moral 
Absolute Against Lying, 41 AM. J. JURIS. 81, 81 (1996); Skolnick & Leo, supra note 4, at 
7; Ariel Porat & Omri Yadlin, Valuable Lies 5 (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory, Working Paper No. 491, 2014), http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?
article=1949&context=public_law_and_legal_theory.
37. See CARSON, supra note 31, at 74 (explaining that lying may be moral when,
for example, one lies to save someone’s life).
38. See Skolnick & Leo, supra note 4, at 7.
 39. See Margaret L. Paris, Lying to Ourselves, 76 OR. L. REV. 817, 819 (1997)
[hereinafter Paris, Lying to Ourselves]; Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery, supra note 
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such as when there are reasonable grounds to be concerned about concrete 
and immediate danger to society on the part of the suspect. 
Normally, however, lies are used during interrogations to elicit confessions 
from suspects for the purpose of prosecution and conviction.40  As such,
police perceive lies as a professional tool for managing interrogations,41 
and as a “necessary evil,” stemming from the principle of necessity, as
there is no dispute over the importance of bringing offenders to justice.42 
A common adage for warranting the use of lies states that “it takes a liar
to catch a liar.”43  Some argue that, given the necessity of lying for law 
enforcement, lying should not be banned and should not be assessed
through the lenses of normative social behavior.44 
The argument further elaborates that lying to suspects is tantamount to
lying to an enemy.  Mendacity used to defeat enemies is considered justified.45 
The enemy is not bound by customary social practices and cannot expect 
their usual protections.46  There is no expectation of trust between enemies.47 
Under this line of thought, interrogators believe that it is permissible to lie
to liars and enemies.48  The suspect harmed the social order.  Perpetrators 
of serious crimes have failed to show a minimum of humanity toward others.49 
Interrogations are designed to identify criminals, not to serve as “a civics
lesson,” and suspects do not expect truthfulness from interrogators.50  The
purpose of lies is indeed to “harm” the suspects: to make them confess,
and thereby to facilitate conviction of the alleged offense.51  But this harm
3, at 800–01.  On the justification of lies to save lives, see BOK, supra note 36, at 109, 113, 
and CARSON, supra note 31, at 162–63. 
40. See Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent from False Confessions and Lost
Confessions—And from Miranda, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 497, 533 (1998); Feld, 
supra note 4, at 220; Magid, supra note 4, at 1174, 1197–98; Miller W. Shealy, Jr., The 
Hunting of Man: Lies, Damn Lies, and Police Interrogations, 4 U. MIAMI RACE & SOC.
JUST. L. REV. 21, 26 (2014); Christopher Slobogin, Lying and Confessing, 39 TEX. TECH
L. REV. 1275, 1275 (2007) [hereinafter Slobogin, Lying and Confessing]; Young, supra
note 2, at 425–26. 
41. Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery, supra note 3, at 784. 
42. Young, supra note 2, at 426 (“Courts admit these confessions uneasily, accepting
lying only as a “necessary evil” of the criminal justice system.”); see Skolnick & Leo, 
supra note 4, at 9. 
43. Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery, supra note 3, at 784. 
44. See Inbau, supra note 14, at 147; Magid, Deceptive Police, supra note 4, at
1186. 
45. See BOK, supra note 36, at 135–40. 
46. Id. at 138. 
47. See  WILLIAM PALEY, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 
107–08 (Liberty Fund, Inc. 2002) (1785). 
48. Young, supra note 2, at 459. 
49. See Inbau, supra note 14, at 151. 
50. Magid, Deceptive Police, supra note 4, at 1182. 
51. See id. at 1168. 
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is the offenders’ just desert.  The immorality of deceit is not therefore self­
evident.52 
Nevertheless, certain types of lies are prohibited.  Thus, lies to suspects 
that mislead them regarding their legal rights, such as their Fifth
Amendment rights to remain silent and to consult with an attorney before 
and during interrogation, are illegitimate.53  Interrogators are not only banned 
from lying about a suspect’s rights, but obligated to inform a suspect 
explicitly about those rights.54  Additionally, according to the holdings of 
the Supreme Courts in Florida and New Jersey, a lie that involves the
fabrication of false evidence in writing is an illegitimate subterfuge.55 
B. Lies Concerning the Incriminating Evidence
Lying to suspects concerning the existence and strength of the 
incriminating evidence against them is a widespread interrogation tactic,56 
and is recommended in police training manuals.57  Interrogators lie to 
52. See George C. Thomas III, Regulating Police Deception During Interrogation, 
39 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1293, 1296 (2007). 
53. Skolnick & Leo, supra note 4, at 5; Slobogin, supra note 40, at 1286 (citing 
William J. Stuntz, Waiving Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 VA. L. REV. 761, 818 
(1989)); White, Police Trickery, supra note 4, at 587. 
54. Young, supra note 2, at 428. 
55. State v. Cayward, 552 So. 2d 971, 973 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); State v.
Chirokovskcic, 860 A.2d 986, 991–92 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).  By contrast, the 
Supreme Court of Nevada did not exclude a confession obtained after the suspect of rape
was presented with a document according to which his sperm was found on the couch
where he allegedly carried out the rape.  Sheriff v. Bessey, 914 P.2d 618, 622 (Nev. 1996). 
56. See GISLI H. GUDJONSSON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS:
A HANDBOOK 8–9 (2003); Richard A. Leo, Why Interrogation Contamination Occurs, 11 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 193, 199 (2013) [hereinafter Leo, Interrogation Contamination]
(citing RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 139–48 (2008) 
[hereinafter LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION]); Morris, supra note 4, at 284–85; Ariel Porat 
& Omri Yadlin, A Welfarist Perspective on Lies, IND. L.J. 617, 650 (2016); Christopher
Slobogin, Comparative Empiricism and Police Investigative Practices, 37 N.C. J. INT’L L.
& COM. REG. 321, 339 (2011) [hereinafter Slobogin, Comparative Empiricism] (citing
Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions, supra note 18, at 11–12, 27–28); Raymond J.
Toney, Disclosure of Evidence and Legal Assistance at Custodial Interrogation: What 
Does the European Convention on Human Rights Require?, 5 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF
39, 42 (2001); Daniel W. Sasaki, Note, Guarding the Guardians: Police Trickery and 
Confessions, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1593, 1593 (1988). 
57. CHARLES E. O’HARA & GREGORY L. O’HARA, FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL 
INVESTIGATION 177 (7th ed. 2003) (pointing out that earlier versions of these same training 
manuals were amongst those the Supreme Court critiqued in Miranda v. Arizona); Morris, 
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suspects about the existence of incriminating evidence against them or 
exaggerate its strength.58  Specifically, interrogators may lie to suspects 
that their accomplice incriminated them,59 that the victim or another eyewitness 
identified them,60 or that forensic evidence, such as fingerprints61 or DNA 
samples,62 was found at the scene of the crime linking them to the event. 
Police interrogators may lie to suspects that the polygraph examination
found their version of events false,63 exaggerating the weight of the polygraph
evidence and creating a sense that the polygraph is infallible.64  Through
these lies, interrogators pretend that all the evidence is known to them and
that it proves the guilt of the suspect beyond a reasonable doubt.  They claim 
that they wish to hear only the explanations of the suspect concerning the 
supra note 4, at 285 (citing FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS
270–71 (Jones & Bartlett Pubs. 5th ed. 2013) (1962)). 
58. Toney, supra note 56, at 42. 
 59. Kevin Corr, A Law Enforcement Primer on Custodial Interrogation, 15 WHITTIER
L. REV. 723, 741 (1994) (citing People v. Jackson, 532 N.Y.S.2d 808, 810 (App. Div.
1988)); Marcus, supra note 6, at 612 (citing United States v. Ceballos, 302 F.3d 679, 694–
95 (7th Cir. 2002); State v. Simons, 944 S.W.2d 165, 176 (Mo. 1997)); Morris, supra note 
4, at 285 (citing Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 737–38 (1969)); Young, supra note 2, at 
426. 
60. Corr, supra note 59, at 741 (citing State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 800 P.2d 1260, 1277
(Ariz. 1990); People v. Holland, 520 N.E.2d 270, 273 (Ill. 1988), aff’d Holland v. Illinois, 
493 U.S. 474 (1990); Nebraska v. Erks, 333 N.W.2d 776, 779 (Neb. 1983)); Marcus, supra
note 6, at 612 (citing United States v. Orso, 266 F.3d 1030, 1032 (9th Cir. 2001); Conner
v. State, 982 S.W.2d 655, 661 (Ark. 1998)); Thomas, supra note 34, at 1183. 
61. Corr, supra note 59, at 741 (citing Green v. Scully, 850 F.2d 894, 903 (2d Cir.
1988); Arizona v. Winters, 556 P.2d 809, 812 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1976); People v. Kashney,
490 N.E.2d 688, 693 (Ill. 1986); People v. Boerckel, 385 N.E.2d 815, 822 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1979)); Marcus, supra note 6, at 613 (citing Lucero v. Kerby, 133 F.3d 1299, 1311 (10th
Cir. 1998); State v. Davila, 908 P.2d 581, 585 (Idaho Ct. App. 1995)); Christine S. Scott-
Hayward, Explaining Juvenile False Confessions: Adolescent Development and Police 
Interrogation, 31 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 53, 69 (2007) (citing Skolnick & Leo, supra note 
4, reprinted in  ISSUES IN POLICING: NEW PERSPECTIVES 78, 82–83 (1993) [hereinafter 
Skolnick & Leo, Ethics of Deceptive Interrogation, reprinted in ISSUES IN POLICING]);
Thomas, supra note 34, at 1183. 
62. Marcus, supra note 6, at 613 (citing Conde v. State, 860 So. 2d 930, 952 (Fla. 
2003)).
63. Morris, supra note 4, at 285; Scott-Hayward, supra note 61, at 69 (citing
Skolnick & Leo, Ethics of Deceptive Interrogation, reprinted in ISSUES IN POLICING, supra
note 61, at 82–83); Thomas III, supra note 52, at 1313 (citing DAVID SIMON, HOMICIDE: A
YEAR ON THE KILLING STREETS 204 (1991)); Young, supra note 2, at 432 (citing United
States ex rel. Lathan v. Deegan, 450 F.2d 181, 185 (2d Cir. 1971)). 
64. Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational 
Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DENV. L. REV. 979, 1036 (1997). 
620
KITAI-SANGERO (DO NOT DELETE) 8/15/2018 10:42 AM     
  
    
 





    
 
 
   
 





   
 
 







   







[VOL. 54:  611, 2017] 	 Extending Miranda
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
reasons that motivated him to commit the offense.65 The aim of these lies
is to destroy the suspect’s self-confidence.66 
Courts worldwide have recognized the legitimacy of police lying to
suspects about the existence and strength of the incriminating evidence 
against them.67  In general, such lies are not perceived as undermining the
voluntary nature of the confession or as causing an innocent suspect to
confess guilt.68 In the United States, the Miranda Court did not restrict lying 
and deceit during interrogations after the suspect waives his Miranda
rights.69  The Supreme Court ruled that the interrogators’ lie about the suspect’s 
accomplice implicating the suspect in the commission of the offense did 
not render the suspect’s confession involuntary under the circumstances
of that case.70 In another case, the Court addressed whether it is possible
to infer that an interrogation was custodial from the police interrogators’ 
lying to the suspect regarding the presence of his fingerprints at the scene
of the incident.71  The Court answered no, without condemning the 
interrogation ruse used by the police.72  As previously noted, the Canadian
Supreme Court has also endorsed certain types of lies regarding the
incriminating evidence during interrogation.73 
In contrast, in England, lying during interrogations is rare.74  The Court
of Appeal in England excluded the confession of a defendant involved in 
arson, obtained after the police lied to the suspect and his solicitor regarding 
the presence of his fingerprints at the scene, and severely criticized the 
65. See Leo, Interrogation Contamination, supra note 56, at 199–200; Ofshe & Leo,
supra note 64, at 1008. 
66. See Leo, supra note 56, at 200. 
67. See R. v. Oickle, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, para. 3, 100 (Can.); Feld, supra note 4, at 
309; Gohara, supra note 4, at 792–94; Wright, supra note 6, at 261; Young, supra note 2,
at 426; Khasin, supra note 4, at 1047; Sasaki, supra note 56, at 1595. 
68. Young, supra note 2, at 442 (citing Commonwealth v. Cressinger, 44 A. 433, 
433 (Pa. 1899)).
69. See Howe, supra note 22, at 930–31; George C. Thomas III & Richard A. Leo, 
The Effects of Miranda v. Arizona:”Embedded” in Our National Culture?, in 29 CRIME 
AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 203, 256 (Michael Tonry ed., 2002). 
70. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 739 (1969).  Many see the Frazier ruling as
giving a green light to lying to a suspect in the course of his interrogation. See Kassin et
al., Police-Induced Confessions, supra note 18, at 13.  The issue of presenting false evidence in
that case, however, was an incidental matter, and most likely this ruse was not the reason 
for the suspect’s confession. See Thomas, supra note 34, at 1184–85. 
71.  Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 494–96 (1977). 
72. Id. at 495–96. 
73. See R. v. Oickle, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, para. 66 (Can.). 
74. See Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions, supra note 18, at 13–14. 
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lying.75  In another case, the Court of Appeal ruled that, although there is 
no obligation to disclose the full extent of evidence against a suspect to
him, the law prohibits actively misleading him with regard to the 
incriminating evidence.76  German law also prohibits the police from lying 
to suspects during interrogation.77  In these legal systems, therefore, there 
is no assumption that lies are essential for law enforcement. 78 
III. ARGUMENTS AGAINST USING LIES
After having considered the justifications for lying during interrogations,
this article turns now to critique. There are many moral arguments against
the use of lies by interrogators to extract confessions in general and against 
the use of lies concerning the incriminating evidence against the suspect,
in particular. 
75.  R. v. Mason [1988] 1 WLR 139 at 144 (Eng.). 
76. R. v. Imran Hussain [1997] EWCA (Crim.) 1401 (Eng.); see also Slobogin, 
supra note 56, at 327 (noting that “England requires taping of all questioning in the
stationhouse,” and that “affirmative misrepresentations about the evidence are barred”
(citing David J. Feldman, England and Wales, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE
STUDY 167, 169 (Craig M. Bradley ed., 2d ed. 2007))). 
 77. Jacqueline Ross, Do Rules of Evidence Apply (Only) in the Courtroom?:
Deceptive Interrogation in the United States and Germany, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 
443, 453 (2008) (citing STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [StPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE]
§ 136a (Ger.)); Slobogin, supra note 56, at 327 (citing Thomas Weigend, Germany, in
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: A WORLDWIDE STUDY, supra note 77, at 243, 258); Stephen C.
Thaman, Miranda in Comparative Law, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 581, 598 (2001) (citing
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] Feb. 27, 1992, 38 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN
DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN STRAFSACHEN [BGHST] 214 (218) (Ger.)). 
78. Slobogin notes that, in England and Germany, the police are allowed to continue
questioning in the face of explicit request of the suspect to remain silent, and this rule may 
compensate for the prohibition to lie. See Slobogin, Lying and Confessing, supra note 40, 
at 1282–83 (citing THE ROYAL COMM’N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE, REPORT 56–57 (1993)); see
also Slobogin, Comparative Empiricism, supra note 56, at 326 (noting that suspects in the 
United Kingdom and Germany have long been informed of their rights to remain silent
(citing Feldman, supra note 76, at 167)).  However, in the United States too, the police
may resume questioning a suspect who invoked his right to silence after they scrupulously
honor this invocation by cutting off questioning, waiting a reasonable amount of time, and
informing the suspect of his Miranda rights once again. See Michigan v. Mosley, 423 
U.S. 96, 104–07 (1975).  Additionally, the police are allowed to interrogate a suspect as 
long as he does not explicitly invoke his Miranda rights to silence and counsel, even in
the face of his silence.  See Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 381–82 (2010) (quoting 
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458–59, 461–62 (1994)).  Moreover, interrogators
are not obliged to cease questioning after invocation as long as the suspect’s statements 
are not introduced during the prosecution’s case-in-chief.  Russell D. Covey, Interrogation
Warrants, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 1867, 1899 (2005). 
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A. The Slippery Slope Argument and Legitimizing Lies
Lies harm the integrity of the police and of the criminal justice system.79 
They undermine the general norm that condemns lies.80  A priori permission
granted to interrogators to lie to suspects with the approval of the legal
system makes mendacity a method and creates a culture of lies.81  Such a 
culture can have devastating effects on the moral strength of the police.82 
The prohibition on fabricating written documents rests, inter alia, on the
concern that the fabricated evidence will end up being incorporated into
the file presented as evidence at trial,83 and on the concern that the police 
might be tempted to forge other documents as well, such as search warrants, 
and harm the fairness of the judicial system and the public trust in it.84 
But the fear of breaching boundaries and of not observing the separation 
between lying in the interrogation room and in the court room persists, 
even when the lie is spoken. One lie may lead to another, because the first 
lie has already violated the internal and external prohibition on lying.85 
Interrogators who routinely lie to suspects may lie to prosecutors and judges
as well.86  After all, the rationale for the legitimacy of the lie, ostensibly in the
name of the public interest, which demands law enforcement and protection 
of public safety, is present throughout the criminal process.87  Contrary to 
other improper means, such as threats, temptations, and sleep deprivation, 
which can naturally be directed only toward suspects, lies can be used also
against prosecutors and fact finders.  Interrogators may lie to prosecutors
and judges, though they are not publicly identified enemies, because of 
79. Young, supra note 2, at 456. 
80.  Skolnick & Leo, supra note 4, at 10. 
81. Jerome H. Skolnick, Deception by Police, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 
1982, at 40, 45. 
82. See Boaz Sangero, Using Tricks and Cover Agents for Extracting Confessions, 
9 ALEI MISHPAT 399, 412 (2011) (Isr.); Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery, supra note 
3, at 800 (“Barker and Carter assert that ‘police lying contributes to police misconduct and 
corruption and undermines the organization’s discipline system.’” (quoting Tom Barker
& David Carter, “Fluffing Up the Evidence and Covering Your Ass:” Some Conceptual
Notes on Police Lying, 11 DEVIANT BEHAV. 61, 71 (1990))). 
83. Skolnick & Leo, supra note 4, at 9 (citing State v. Cayward, 552 So. 2d 971, 
974 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)); Thomas III, supra note 52, at 1308. 
84.  Skolnick & Leo, supra note 4, at 9. 
85.  Robert F. Nagel, Lies and Law, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 605, 616 (1998).
86. Jones, supra note 6, at 530; Skolnick & Leo, supra note 4, at 9; see Gohara, 
supra note 4, at 832–33.  On the phenomenon of police officers lying in court, see generally 
Melanie D. Wilson, An Exclusionary Rule for Police Lies, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2010). 
87. See Sangero, supra note 82, at 415–16; Young, supra note 2, at 463–64. 
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their disagreement on the concept of public safety and their insistence on
due process.88 
Furthermore, allowing interrogators to lie creates an anomalous situation 
and a “double standard,” under which police officers are allowed to lie but 
suspects are not.89  Whereas a lie by interrogators to suspects has no cost 
associated with it for the interrogators, if suspects lie to interrogators they
commit a criminal offense.90  Though lying in an effort to fight crime may 
be viewed as less culpable than lying about a crime one has committed, it 
is difficult to think of a solid moral justification for such an anomalous 
situation that allows interrogators to lie to suspects but prohibits suspects
from lying to the interrogators.  Suspects who know that the interrogators
are lying to them may feel that their lies to the interrogators are justified 
as well.91  If the police treat suspects as enemies, there is a good chance
that suspects will view police interrogators as enemies.92  In general, lying
by police interrogators to citizens legitimizes lying by citizens to the
police.93 
B. Harm to the Relationship of Trust Between Citizens and 

Police and to Due Values 

Trust is a fundamental principle of any social order, and lies generally
harm trust.94  Systematic lies by the police “undermine[] public confidence”
in the integrity of the police as an institution.95  Harm to the public’s
confidence in police may harm public cooperation.96  Law enforcement
personnel should serve as paragons and set an example for correct values 
through appropriate behavior.97  Tolerating lies sends a problematic and 
88. See Carl B. Klockars, Blue Lies and Police Placebos: The Moralities of Police 
Lying, 27 AM. BEHAV. SCI. 529, 540 (1984); Sangero, supra note 82, at 416; Young, supra
note 2, at 464. 
89. Dorothy Heyl, The Limits of Deception: An End to the Use of Lies and Trickery
in Custodial Interrogations to Elicit the “Truth”?, 77 ALBANY L. REV. 931, 941 (2014).
This is contrary to the situation in Germany where suspects are allowed to lie but the police
are not.  Ross, supra note 77, at 473. 
90. See Howe, supra note 22, at 962. 
91. See Ross, supra note 77, at 473. 
92. See id. at 460–61. 
93. Young, supra note 2, at 460. 
94. Richard A. Leo, Miranda’s Revenge: Police Interrogation as a Confidence 
Game, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 259, 264 (1996); see BOK, supra note 36, at 28–29. 
95.  Skolnick & Leo, supra note 4, at 9; see Young, supra note 2, at 457. 
 96. Laura Hoffman Roppé, Comment, True Blue? Whether Police Should Be Allowed
to Use Trickery and Deception to Extract Confessions, 31 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 729, 763
(1994); see Young, supra note 2, at 458–59. 
97. See SHIFFRIN, supra note 13, at 198–99; Paris, Trust, Lies, and Interrogation, 
supra note 14, at 31–32. 
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inconsistent message regarding the appropriate values that should underlie 
the criminal justice system.98  It is easier to accept moral condemnation 
from people who are deemed moral.99  The quandary of Bishop Myriel in
Victor Hugo’s novel Les Misérables about the relationship between the 
moral flaw inherent in the commission of an offense and the moral flaw
of lying to suspects, illustrates this point: 
One day he heard a criminal case, which was in preparation and on the point
of trial, discussed in a drawing-room. A wretched man, being at the end of his
resources, had coined counterfeit money, out of love for a woman, and for the
child which he had had by her.  Counterfeiting was still punishable with death
at that epoch.  The woman had been arrested in the act of passing the first false
piece made by the man.  She was held, but there were no proofs except against 
her.  She alone could accuse her lover, and destroy him by her confession.  She
denied; they insisted.  She persisted in her denial.  Thereupon an idea occurred to
the attorney for the crown.  He invented an infidelity on the part of the lover, and
succeeded, by means of fragments of letters cunningly presented, in persuading 
the unfortunate woman that she had a rival, and that the man was deceiving her.
Thereupon, exasperated by jealousy, she denounced her lover, confessed all, proved
all.
The man was ruined.  He was shortly to be tried at Aix with his accomplice.
They were relating the matter, and each one was expressing enthusiasm over the 
cleverness of the magistrate.  By bringing jealousy into play, he had caused the 
truth to burst forth in wrath, he had educed the justice of revenge.  The Bishop 
listened to all this in silence.  When they had finished, he inquired,— 
“Where are this man and woman to be tried?”
 
“At the Court of Assizes.”
 
He went on, “And where will the advocate of the crown be tried?”100
 
Indeed, as good intent is by and large no justification for violating the 
law, there is no justification in the normal case for lies—including ugly 
lies that cause people to lose trust in loved ones—told ostensibly for a good
purpose.101  Specifically, lies told during interrogations could harm the suspect’s 
confidence in both the interrogators and the police as a whole.102  Breach 
of trust on the part of the interrogators, and the knowledge that interrogators
are lying to suspects, can affect the ability of suspects to trust representatives 
of law enforcement agencies in the later stages of the criminal process and
 98. See Khasin, supra note 4, at 1036. 
99. Paris, Trust, Lies, and Interrogation, supra note 14, at 32. 
100. VICTOR HUGO, LES MISÉRABLES 13 (Isabel F. Hapgood trans., Thomas Y. Crowell 
& Co. 1887) (1862). 
101. Sangero, supra note 82, at 415. 
102. See SHIFFRIN, supra note 13, at 198–99. 
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lead to failure to trust legitimate proposals on the part of the interrogators.103 
Such distrust could harm the ability of law enforcement agencies to search
for the truth. 
C. Harm to Human Dignity and to the Presumption of Innocence 
Lies harm “the dignity of suspects.”104  The harm to dignity follows not
only from the false statement but also from the underlying assumption of 
guilt expressed.  Suspects, who assumedly interrogators must presume innocent,
are perceived as guilty from the outset of the interrogation.105  Interrogators
allow themselves to lie under the assumption that suspects are guilty and 
that they lie when denying guilt.106  Innocent suspects, then, do not fit
the scenario under which interrogators may lie to catch a liar.107  There is
a relation between the interrogator’s tendency to assume guilt and the use 
of manipulative techniques on his part during interrogations.108  An interrogator
whose working assumption includes the possibility of the suspect’s innocence 
does not make eliciting the suspect’s confession the goal of the interrogation. 
It may be argued, however, that lies do not necessarily assume the guilt 
of the suspect.  The aim of the lie is to test the reaction of the suspect and to 
distinguish in this way between guilty and innocent suspects.  Additionally, 
the lie can cause a suspect to provide other evidence apart from the confession.
But it is highly doubtful whether interrogators are able to glean guilt or 
innocence from reaction.109  Feelings of stress, fear, and anger, as well as
the desire of an innocent suspect to prove his innocence, could create
a perception that he is a criminal.110  It is difficult to maintain that there is 
103. See Sangero, supra note 82, at 415; Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery, supra
note 3, at 799. 
104. Milhizer, supra note 1, at 88. 
105. Although the Supreme Court held in Bell v. Wolfish that the presumption of 
innocence does not apply prior to trial, the presumption of innocence bears a broader 
meaning.  441 U.S. 520, 532–33 (1979); see Rinat Kitai, Presuming Innocence, 55 OKLA.
L. REV. 257, 259 (2002). 
106. See Young, supra note 2, at 459, 461–62. 
107. See id. at 459. 
108. Saul M. Kassin et al., Police Interviewing and Interrogation: A Self-Report 
Survey of Police Practices and Beliefs, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 381, 395 (2007); see also
Jerome Hall, Objectives of Federal Criminal Procedural Revision, 51 YALE L.J. 723, 730 
(1942) (explaining the rationale that “social defense” assumes guilt). 
109. See RICHARD A. LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 226 (2008);
Saul M. Kassin, Human Judges of Truth, Deception, and Credibility: Confident but Erroneous, 
23 CARDOZO L. REV. 809, 810–12, 815 (2002) [hereinafter Kassin, Human Judges of Truth].
110. See GUDJONSSON, supra note 56, at 25–28; Danny Ciraco, Reverse Engineering, 
11 WINDSOR REV. LEGAL & SOC. ISSUES 41, 51–52 (2001) (citing SIMON, supra note 63, 
at 206) (Can.); Keith A. Findley, Adversarial Inquisitions: Rethinking the Search for the 
Truth, 56 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 911, 926 (2011–2012) (quoting Dan Simon, The Limited 
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a specific pattern of response to false incriminating evidence that credibly
draws the line between guilty and innocent suspects.111 
The harm to dignity also results from the severe injury to the feelings
of the innocent suspect, who is confronted with overwhelming incriminating 
evidence. An innocent person, who believes there is such incriminating 
evidence against him, may feel anxiety and severe mental distress in response 
to the expected false conviction, and perhaps even at the thought that he 
is being set up.112  In the already difficult situation of an interrogation, the
innocent suspect’s “only hope lies in the knowledge of his innocence.”113 
His confrontation with the alleged incriminating evidence against him 
dismantles his remaining hope of extricating himself from his predicament 
and of not becoming another victim of a false conviction.114  Leo and 
Ofshe compare the situation of an innocent suspect confronted with both 
the interrogator’s allegations and his refusal to admit the possibility that
he may be wrong, to the experience of a person who wakes up in the 
morning and finds, in the spirit of the Kafka’s story The Metamorphosis, 
that he has become a cockroach, unable to change his situation.115  Hence,
presenting false incriminating evidence to a suspect, in a way that the
suspect believes that his conviction is inevitable, borders on emotional abuse.
Slobogin argues that it is possible to justify lying to suspects if the 
evidence against them is strong.116  In his opinion, arresting a person based
on probable cause is an appropriate point in time for the police to lie
regarding the incriminating evidence because a judge will shortly review 
the evidence required for arrest, and he is not part of the investigating 
Diagnosticity of Criminal Trials, 64 VAND. L. REV. 143, 175, 179 (2011)); Kassin, Human
Judges of Truth, supra note 109, at 812. 
111. See Gallini, supra note 4, at 577 (stating that “there exists no physiological or 
psychological response unique to lying”); Kassin, Psychology of Confessions, supra note 
18, at 219–20; Mann et al., Suspects, Lies, and Videotape: An Analysis of Authentic High-
Stake Liars, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 365, 365 (2002); Julianne M. Read et al.,
Investigative Interviewing of Suspected Sex Offenders: A Review of What Constitutes Best 
Practice, 11 INT’L J. POLICE SCI. & MGMT. 442, 448 (2009) (citing Lucy Akehurst & Aldert 
Vrij, Creating Suspects in Police Interviews, 29 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 192, 192–93 
(1999)); Vrij et al., Cues to Deception and Ability to Detect Lies as a Function of Police 
Interview Styles, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 499, 514 (2007)). 
112. See Young, supra note 2, at 468–69; Thomas, supra note 34, at 1195, 1197. 
113. Thomas, supra note 34, at 1201. 
114. See id.
 115. See Ofshe & Leo, supra note 64, at 1043. 
116. Slobogin, Deceit, Pretext, and Trickery, supra note 3, at 777. 
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authority.117  Furthermore, by the very arrest, the suspect is warned of the
adversarial relation between her and the interrogator, and to the fact that 
the interrogator perceives her as an enemy.118 
But suspects are not enemies, who are outside of standard social
connections.119  This metaphor is not suitable for most suspects and 
defendants.120  The definition of crime may be disputable and politically­
skewed.121  Besides, there are offenders whose violation of the law—for 
which they will have to answer—is dwarfed by their overall contribution to
society.  Other offenders made a single mistake or may rehabilitate.  Many 
other offenders have not committed a particularly serious offense that
undermines the foundations of the social order.122 
Furthermore, perceiving suspects as enemies is inconsistent with the
obligation imposed on police officers to inform suspects of their Fifth
Amendment rights to remain silent and to consult with an attorney before 
and during interrogation, and to enable them to exercise these rights.123 
As a matter of policy, individuals who are considered innocent in relation 
to the offense of which they are accused cannot be considered enemies.124 
An evidentiary standard of probable cause is insufficient to make a person
into an enemy.125  Although incriminating evidence against an individual
weakens the factual presumption of innocence before the verdict,126 the existence
of such evidence against a person does not weaken the presumption of 
innocence at the normative level.127  Treating a person as guilty before his
guilt is established and before he is given the opportunity to address the 
incriminating evidence against him violates his dignity.128  It is, therefore, 
inappropriate to lie to suspects based on their status as ostensible “enemies.” 
117. See id. at 803, 810–11. 
118. See id. at 811. 
119. See Paris, Lying to Ourselves, supra note 39, at 830. 
120. See Robert P. Mosteller, Moderating Investigative Lies by Disclosure and 
Documentation, 76 OR. L. REV. 833, 834 (1997). 
121. See Kenneth B. Nunn, The Trial as Text: Allegory, Myth and Symbol in the 
Adversarial Criminal Process—A Critique of the Role of the Public Defender and a 
Proposal for Reform, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 743, 764–65 (1995). 
122. Slobogin states that the use of trickery during interrogation “might be restricted 
to investigations of felonies.” Slobogin, Lying and Confessing, supra note 40, at 1279. 
Not every felony, however, shocks society to render a felon enemy.
123. See Klockars, supra note 88, at 533. 
124. See Mosteller, supra note 120, at 834–35. 
125. See id.
 126. See Mark Heerema, Uncovering the Presumption of Factual Innocence in
Canadian Law: A Theoretical Model for the “Pre-Charge Presumption of Innocence,” 28 
DALHOUSIE L.J. 443, 451 (2005) (Can.); Kitai, supra note 105, at 288–93. 
127. See Bruce A. Antkowiak, Saving Probable Cause, 40 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 569, 
594 (2007); Kitai, supra note 105, at 292–93. 
128. See Kitai, supra note 105, at 284. 
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D. Incriminating the Innocent 
1. Entanglement in Lies 
One risk that suspects face when dealing with false evidence is becoming 
entangled in lies to distance themselves from the incriminating evidence
presented against them.129  This is, indeed, one of the risks against which 
the right against self-incrimination seeks to protect.  A key deontological 
argument justifying the right against self-incrimination concerns the 
trilemma facing accused persons who must respond to accusations against 
them by choosing one of three unfavorable options: (a) self-incrimination—
if they choose to tell the truth; (b) entanglement in false testimony—if they
choose to lie; and (c) risking contempt of court—if they choose to breach
the law by remaining silent.130 The right against self-incrimination was intended
to rescue accused persons from the trilemma they face by giving them the
possibility to choose a path that does not lead directly to their downfall.131 
Some believe silence is morally preferable to lying and that the right against 
self-incrimination is important because it removes the incentive to lie.132 
But when the interrogator lies to an innocent suspect that his fingerprints
were found at the scene of the crime, she encourages the suspect to lie. 
An innocent suspect might lie by providing an innocent explanation to his
presence at the scene of the crime, based on his belief that his presence
there—which did not occur—has been proven, and that the only option
available to him to escape an indictment and conviction is to lie.133 When
the explanation of the innocent suspect is disproved, he becomes enmeshed 
in his lies, which are liable to strengthen the incriminating evidence
against him.134
 129. See Thomas III, supra note 52, at 1299–1300. 
130. This is referred to as the “cruel trilemma” of the English Judicial System, and
public outcry against it was a direct precursor to the Fifth Amendment.  JOE RUBENFELD, 
REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 33–34 
(2005).
131. See Erwin N. Griswold, The Right to Be Let Alone, 55 NW. U. L. REV. 216, 222 
(1960).
132. See Stuntz, Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering, supra note 21, at 1942. 
133. Sangero, supra note 82, at 415.  For analysis of such cases, see Brandon L. 
Garrett, The Substance of False Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1051, 1097–99 (2010). 
134. For more on the ability of a suspect’s lies to strengthen the incriminating
evidence against him, see Paul G. Cassell & Bret S. Hayman, Police Interrogation in the
1990s: An Empirical Study of the Effects of Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 839, 864 (1996);
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2. The Risk of False Confessions 
Lies about the existence and strength of the incriminating evidence might 
lead to false confessions.135  Why would an innocent suspect confess in 
response to misleading incriminating evidence?  First, when the interrogators 
claim that they have evidence which in fact does not exist, they create a
risk that the suspect becomes persuaded that all claims to innocence are
solely a fruitless endeavor.136  “Cost-benefit” considerations may lead
a suspect, who is certain of his conviction, to make a false confession, which
from his point of view appears to be rational.137 
Second, innocent suspects might become persuaded that they committed 
the offense attributed to them.138  Suspects who were under the influence
of drugs or alcohol at the time of the incident and do not remember its 
details may be persuaded of the veracity of the police’s version regarding
the events.139  Other innocent suspects, however, may be persuaded to believe
both their own guilt and the fact that they do not remember the details of 
the painful event.140  The belief of an innocent suspect in the interrogator’s
claim, and their disorientation during the interrogation, might lead them 
to doubt their own memory and believe they suppressed committing the 
offense.141  Thus, as noted by Kassin, one of the leading scholars researching 
the phenomenon of false confessions: 
Daniel J. Seidmann & Alex Stein, The Right to Silence Helps the Innocent: A Game-
Theoretic Analysis of the Fifth Amendment Privilege, 114 HARV. L. REV. 430, 443 (2000). 
135. See Young, supra note 2, at 454, 468; Khasin, supra note 4, at 1032 (citing
Welsh S. White, False Confessions and the Constitution: Safeguards Against Untrustworthy 
Confessions, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 105, 128 (1997) [hereinafter White, False
Confessions]).
136. See R. v. Oickle, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, para. 43 (Can.). 
137. Alan Hirsch, Threats, Promises, and False Confessions: Lessons of Slavery, 49 
HOW. L.J. 31, 35 (2005); see Morris, supra note 4, at 284. 
138. See Oickle, 2 S.C.R. 3, para. 43. 
139. Young, supra note 2, at 462 (citing JEROME H. SKOLNICK & JAMES J. FYFE,
ABOVE THE LAW 61 (1993)).
140. See Kassin & Kiechel, supra note 15, at 125–26; Christopher Sherrin, False 
Confessions and Admissions in Canadian Law, 30 QUEEN’S L.J. 601, 621–22 (2005);
Skolnick & Leo, supra note 4, at 8 (quoting Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman, 
Confession Evidence, in  THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE 67, 78 
(1985)); Khasin, supra note 4, at 1033 (quoting White, False Confessions, supra note 135, 
at 109). 
141. See Hirsch, supra note 137, at 35–36; Kageleiry, Jr., supra note 15, at 40–41;
Scott-Hayward, supra note 61, at 68 (quoting Michael Crowe, It Happened to Me, JANE 
MAG., Dec. 2002); White, False Confessions, supra note 135, at 128. 
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Many classic experiments have shown that the presentation of false information (through
confederates, witnesses, counterfeit test results, bogus norms, false physiological
feedback, and the like) can substantially alter people’s visual perceptions, beliefs,
behaviors, emotions, memories, and even certain physiological outcomes, as seen
in medical studies of the classic placebo effect.142 
Unlike guilty suspects, who know incriminating evidence against them is 
credible, innocent suspects, who do not understand the very existence of 
incriminating evidence against them, experience the undermining of reality.143 
Mark Kuznetsov, who was accused of murder and acquitted in the Tel 
Aviv District Court in Israel, may serve as an example for this phenomenon. 
Kuznetsov testified in court about the mental process he underwent during 
the interrogation, which had led him to make a false confession, stating 
that: 
During that period of my life logic betrayed me and the worst thing that happened
was that the interrogations caused me, a day after the initial interrogations, at
night, when I was going to sleep, not during sleep, but while awake, to interrogate 
myself, maybe I don’t remember what I did. . . I had never lost my memory. . . 
This convinced me once again that I didn’t do it. But the worst thing that
happened to me was this shadow of a doubt. . . And it was even more difficult for
me to choose some kind of stand in the interrogations, especially when I was cut 
off from everything, from my parents, an attorney.144 
Indeed, it is possible to manipulate and contaminate memories.  One
experiment attempted to ask people about a strange childhood incident 
involving them bumping into a table when goofing around at a wedding
and spilling punch on the parents of the bride; after several interviews,
about twenty-percent of respondents provided false information.145  In  
another experiment, participants in Elizabeth Loftus’s study “recalled” the
142.  Saul M. Kassin, Inside Interrogation: Why Innocent People Confess, 32 AM. J.
TRIAL ADVOC. 525, 535 (2009) [hereinafter Kassin, Inside Interrogation].
143. Therefore, I oppose Slobogin’s approach, which states, “Even if the police go 
to the trouble of fabricating evidence that can be shown to the suspect, the pressure to talk
is no greater than in cases where the evidence actually exists.”  Christopher Slobogin,
Manipulation of Suspects and Unrecorded Questioning: After 50 Years of Miranda Jurisprudence, 
Still Two (or Maybe Three) Burning Issues, 97 B.U. L. REV. 1157 (2017).  When the evidence
is real, no undermining of reality exists. 
144.  File No. 1172/04 DC (TA), State of Israel v. Kuznetzov (Dec. 12, 2005), Nevo 
Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
145. Steven B. Duke et al., A Picture’s Worth a Thousand Words: Conversational 
Versus Eyewitness Testimony in Criminal Convictions, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 32 (2007)
(citing Ira E. Hyman, Jr., Creating False Autobiographical Memories: Why People Believe 
Their Memory Errors, in ECOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO COGNITION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF
ULRIC NEISSER 229, 236 (Eugene Winograd et al. eds., 1999)). 
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experience implanted in their memory of getting lost in a shopping mall
as children.146 Hence, information that individuals learn about events after
the fact can be stored in their minds and change their memory regarding
the original incident.147 
David Hume described the fragile boundary between imagination and 
memory: 
And as an idea of the memory, by losing its force and vivacity, may degenerate 
to such a degree, as to be taken for an idea of the imagination; so on the other
hand an idea of the imagination may acquire such a force and vivacity, as to pass
for an idea of the memory, and counterfeit its effects on the belief and judgment. 
This is noted in the case of liars; who by the frequent repetition of their lies, come
at last to believe and remember them, as realities; having habit and custom in this
case, as in many others, and Infixing the idea with equal force and Vigour.148 
Memory can indeed mislead.  In many cases, individuals overcome the 
frailties of the human memory by creating a false memory.149  Naturally, 
lying may exacerbate this phenomenon. When an innocent suspect believes
his own guilt and that he does not remember the details of the incident, he 
is liable to complete the missing details from his imagination and believe 
in their existence. 
There is no disagreement on the principle that lies, which create a significant
risk of false confessions, are illegitimate.150  Nevertheless, some believe
that lies concerning the incriminating evidence are not expected to lead to 
false confessions.  Indeed, it is difficult to estimate to what degree lies cause 
suspects to confess, and how many suspects who confess are innocent.151 
A study conducted by Richard Leo found that confronting suspects with
strong incriminating evidence is very useful in obtaining confessions: seventy-
eight percent of suspects confronted with true evidence confessed, and
eighty-three percent of suspects confronted with false evidence did so.152 
Likewise, other studies demonstrated that the strength of the real or perceived
incriminating evidence is a central factor in the decision to confess.153 
146. Elizabeth F. Loftus, The Reality of Repressed Memories, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST
518, 532 (1993). 
147. Corey John Ayling, Comment, Corroborating Confessions: An Empirical Analysis 
of Legal Safeguards Against False Confessions, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 1121, 1175–76. 
148. DAVID HUME, Of the Impressions of the Senses and Memory, in 1 A TREATISE 
OF HUMAN NATURE 86 (L.A. Selby-Bigge, ed. 1896) (1739). 
149. See Loftus, supra note 146, at 532.
 150. See, e.g., Inbau, supra note 14, at 152; Morris, supra note 4, at 284 (regarding 
interrogations methods in general). 
151. See Feld, supra note 4, at 311. 
152. Richard A. Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
266, 293–94 (1996). 
153. See Michel St-Yves & Nadine Deslauriers-Varin, The Psychology of Suspects’
Decision-Making During Interrogation, in HANDBOOK OF PSYCHOLOGY OF INVESTIGATIVE
632
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While lies significantly increase confessions, it is unknowable how many 
of the suspects who confessed when confronted with false evidence were
innocent.
Some believe that even in the face of false evidence that appears 
overwhelming, which causes anger and hopelessness, an innocent person 
would not admit guilt. An innocent person has no reason to do so.  After 
all, confession may lead to a wrongful conviction.154  According to this line
of thought, a confession of guilt requires a component in addition to the
lies, such as threats or temptations of a reduced punishment.155  It is argued
that most innocent suspects will try to confront the evidence presented to 
them and to prove its unreliability.156 
But the presentation of false evidence constitutes both a threat and a
concealed temptation.  It conveys a message to the suspect that he will be 
convicted in any case, without gaining the benefit resulting from his
collaboration.157  The suspect’s assessment that his conviction is inevitable so
he has nothing to lose by confessing, and that his confession adds nothing to
what is already known to the interrogators, can lead him to believe
that confession may benefit him by casting him in a more favorable light 
in the eyes of the court, thereby lessening his punishment.158 
In any case, there is no need to seek an explicit benefit in the form of a
temptation gained from confession.  Interrogation, in the course of which 
considerable pressure is exerted and the accusation is hurled at the suspect
again and again, is a traumatic experience.159  The mere ending of the
interrogation after confession is an immediate benefit to an innocent
suspect.160  Every suspect understands this, even without a banner hanging
in the interrogation room stating “better treatment for confessing and worse
INTERVIEWING: CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 1, 6–7 (Ray Bull et al.
eds., 2009); Divya Sukumar et al., Strategic Disclosure of Evidence: Perspectives from
Psychology and Law, 22 PSYCH. PUB. POL. & L. 306, 306–07 (2016) [hereinafter Sukumar 
et al., Strategic Disclosure].
154. See Thomas III, supra note 52, at 1300; see also Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 
739 (1969).
155. See INBAU ET AL., supra note 57, at 421; Thomas III, supra note 52, at 1299–1300. 
156. See Thomas III, supra note 52, at 1300. 
157. See Gohara, supra note 4, at 825–26. 
158. See Kageleiry, Jr., supra note 15, at 40; Paris, Trust, Lies, and Interrogation, 
supra note 14, at 24; White, False Confessions, supra note 135, at 130; Hamblet, supra note 
30, at 130. 
159. White, False Confessions, supra note 135, at 143. 
160.  Bradford & Goodman-Delahunty, supra note 28, at 113. 
 633
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treatment for resisting.”161 This statement holds true also for an interrogation
that does not involve lies.  But lies, which cause the suspect to believe that,
given the evidence against him, insisting on innocence seems futile, spurs 
the illusion that the suspect can only end the interrogation by confessing.162 
Additionally, even without attempting to derive future benefit from
confession, an innocent suspect who believes that, given the overwhelming 
incriminating evidence, he has no chance of proving his innocence and 
therefore there is no point in disavowing guilt,163 may confess because of 
despair,164 a mental breakdown,165 the collapse of his will power,166 doubts 
about his sanity,167 or because of the ostensible knowledge of someone in
a position of authority.168  Contrary to true evidence, lies deliberately create
those risks. 
Ethical limitations on research make it difficult to conduct an experiment 
that simulates the true conditions of a lengthy and high-pressure interrogation 
to examine how lying about incriminating evidence affects an innocent 
suspect’s willingness to confess.169  Even if it were possible to make such
a simulation, it would be difficult to isolate lies from other factors, such as
the pressure of detention or fatigue. 
Nevertheless, laboratory studies have shown that lies concerning the 
existence of incriminating evidence increase the risk of false confessions
and internalization of imagined guilt.170  Kassin and Kiechel conducted a
well-known experiment, an aim of which was to investigate the effect of
 161. Yi Yanyou, State Ideology Transition and Procedure Model Reformation: 
China’s Criminal Procedure Law and Its Revisions, 4 TSINGHUA CHINA L. REV. 155, 179
(2012) (noting that Chinese interrogators actually hang such a banner in the interrogation 
room).
162. Feld, supra note 4, at 313 (citing Kassin, Psychology of Confessions, supra note 
18, at 224); Gohara, supra note 4, at 818; Wright, supra note 6, at 262 (citing Fred E.
INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS 419 (Aspen Publishers, Inc.
4th ed. 2004) (1962)). 
163. See Thomas, supra note 34, at 1192; White, False Confessions, supra note 135, 
at 146–47; White, Police Trickery, supra note 4, at 625 (citing FRED E. INBAU & JOHN E.
REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION & CONFESSIONS 30 (2d ed. 1967)); Khasin, supra note 4,
at 1043. 
164. Feld, supra note 4, at 313 (citing Kassin, Psychology of Confessions, supra note 
18, at 224); Khasin, supra note 4, at 1043. 
165. Khasin, supra note 4, at 1043. 
166. Thomas, supra note 34, at 1192. 
167. Khasin, supra note 4, at 1043. 
168. White, supra note 4, at 624 (citing INBAU & REID, supra note 163, at 13–17). 
169. Slobogin, supra note 56, at 340 (citing Melissa B. Russano et al., Investigating
True and False Confessions Within a Novel Experimental Paradigm, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 481, 
483–84 (2006)); see also Allison D. Redlich & Gail S. Goodman, Taking Responsibility 
for an Act Not Committed: The Influence of Age and Suggestibility, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
141, 151 (2003). 
170. See Kassin, Inside Interrogation, supra note 142, at 535. 
634
KITAI-SANGERO (DO NOT DELETE) 8/15/2018 10:42 AM     
  
    
 
  
































[VOL. 54:  611, 2017] 	 Extending Miranda
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
false evidence on the willingness of innocent people to admit guilt.171 
Seventy-nine students were asked to type in a few letters that were read to 
them, after being told to be careful not to press the Alt key because it
causes the program to crash and lose all data.172  The letters were read at
a fast speed to some of the students, and slowly to others.173  In the course 
of typing, the computer stopped working, and the experimenter asked the 
student angrily whether he touched the Alt key.174  The experimenter also 
asked the person reading the letter, who was part of the experiment team,
whether he saw the student touch the Alt key.175  In some cases, the reader 
answered in the affirmative, in others in the negative.176  The students who 
typed the data were asked to sign a form stating “I hit the ‘ALT’ key and 
caused the program to crash.  Data were lost,” knowing they were likely
to receive a call from the principal experimenter.177  Although initially all
the students denied the charge leveled at them, sixty-nine percent later 
admitted their imagined guilt and signed the confession form; twenty-eight 
percent internalized their guilt; and nine percent added imaginary details 
concerning the circumstances under which they touched the Alt key.178 
The rate of confessions among students whose letters were read at a rapid 
pace, as well as the rate of the confessors who believed in their guilt, was
significantly higher than the rate of confessions among students for whom 
the letters were read slowly.179  The rate of confessions and internalization 
of guilt among students whose reader falsely testified that he saw them press
the Alt key was higher than among students whose reader testified that he
had not noticed the Alt key having been pressed.180  According to the authors, 
the experiment demonstrated that presenting false evidence increases the
rate of confessions, makes people believe in their guilt, and causes people
to change their memories of the events.181 
171. Kassin & Kiechel, supra note 15, at 126.  For more about this experiment, see 
also Kassin, Inside Interrogation, supra note 142, at 535–36; Edward J. Sackman, False
Confessions: Rethinking a Contemporary Problem, 16 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 208, 225– 
26 (2006) (citing Kassin & Kiechel, supra note 15, at 125–26). 
172. 
173. 










Id.; see also Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions, supra note 18, at 17. 
 Kassin & Kiechel, supra note 15, at 127. 
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This experiment, obviously, does not simulate the reality of an interrogation,
which includes conditions of isolation and fear of expected punishment in
the case of conviction.  Given the qualitative difference between confession 
of having negligently pressed a key, which is expected to trigger only
minimal harm, and confession of committing a serious offense, the ability
of research of this type to shed light on the phenomenon of false 
confessions is limited.182  As noted by the authors themselves, the participants
were accused of negligent behavior, which does not involve disgrace, and 
not of deliberate behavior, and therefore the barrier before a false confession
may be lower.183  Furthermore, the very definition of the conduct as negligent
indicates the perpetrator acted without awareness of the circumstances of 
the offense. Therefore, although the experiment sheds light on certain
aspects of one’s personality, such as adherence to authority and the ability
to “remember” imaginary information, there may have been students who 
truly believed that they pressed the key inadvertently.184  The fact that there 
were significant gaps between the rates of confessions among students
who had the letters read to them at a rapid pace and those who had the
letters read to them slowly reinforces this conclusion.185  Additional experiments 
that were conducted in the spirit of the experiment of the imaginary pressing 
of the Alt key have yielded similar findings.186 
In another study, conducted by Nash and Wade, participants in a 
computerized gambling experiment were asked to return counterfeit money
to the bank after providing a wrong answer, and to take counterfeit money
from the bank after providing a correct answer.187  On the computer screen, a
V checkmark appeared after a correct answer and an X sign after a wrong 
182.  Redlich & Goodman, supra note 169, at 151. 
183.  Kassin & Kiechel, supra note 15, at 127. 
184. See Russano, supra note 169, at 482. 
185.  Redlich & Goodman, supra note 169, at 143–44. 
186. See id. at 147–151.  The main purpose of this study was to examine the effect 
of age on the willingness to confess. Id. at 151. Ninety-six participants were warned
against pressing the Alt key, and this time a computer printout provided imaginary proof 
that the forbidden key was pressed.  Id. at 144, 146.  Here also, some of the participants 
were presented with false evidence in the form of a computer printout, and to some
participants no such evidence was presented. Id. at 146. In this experiment as well, sixty-
nine percent of participants accepted responsibility for the imaginary pressing of the 
prohibited key. Id. at 154. Presentation of the false evidence did not increase the
percentage of those who admitted pressing the key among college students and among
participants between the ages of twelve and thirteen, but only among participants aged fifteen
to sixteen. Id. at 148.  Among those in the twelve to thirteen age group who admitted 
pressing the key, a significantly greater percentage believed that they were responsible for
pressing the forbidden key upon exposure to the false evidence. Id. at 154. 
187. Robert A. Nash  & Kimberley A. Wade, Innocent but Proven Guilty: Eliciting
Internalized False Confessions Using Doctored-Video Evidence, 23 APPLIED COGNITIVE
PSYCHOL. 624, 625 (2009). 
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answer.188  The experimenters used digital editing software to fabricate
evidence according to which participants took money from the bank instead 
of returning money to it, despite the fact that ostensibly an X appeared on
the computer screen.189  All the participants admitted to taking money 
illegally if they were charged that they did so on one occasion, and sixty-
three percent of the participants internalized imaginary guilt.190  It seems 
that, when confronted with the fake video evidence, participants could
easily believe to have made a one-time mistake concerning the rules of
the game.  But even when participants were accused of taking money from 
the bank three times rather than returning it, although it was unlikely that
such a mistake could be made in good faith so often, ninety-three percent 
admitted their guilt.191  One must still bear in mind that the results of a
confession were rather limited: confession meant the subject would not 
receive the promised payment for participating, while refusing to confess
meant having to participate in a subsequent experiment.192  Because the
game was played using counterfeit money, the confession did not involve 
an offense that disgraces the participant. 
Turning to the real world and serious crimes, a seventeen-year-old youth 
confessed to murdering his mother after an interrogator confronted him 
with a series of false incriminating pieces of evidence.193  Among other lies,
the interrogator told the suspect that his father, who was severely hurt in 
the attack that killed his mother, regained consciousness and asserted that 
it was his son who had attacked him.194  The youth confessed because he
believed that the story told by his father, who was an object of his admiration 
and who had never lied, must be true.195  The youth was convicted of murder
and spent many years in jail before he was exonerated.196  Even in high-
stakes cases, then, when confronted with incriminating evidence innocent 




Id. at 627, 627 fig.2. 
Id. at 627. 
190. Id. at 629. 
191. Id. at 631. 
192. Id. at 628. 
193. 
194. 
Kassin, Inside Interrogation, supra note 142, at 536. 
Id. 
195. Id. (quoting RICHARD FIRSTMAN & JAY SALPETER, A CRIMINAL INJUSTICE: A
TRUE CRIME, A FALSE CONFESSION, AND THE FIGHT TO FREE MARTY TANKLEFF 278–79 (2008));
Gohara, supra note 4, at 793. 
196. Id.
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3. Distinction between Different Types of Lies with Respect 
to the Risk of False Confessions 
Some distinguish between types of evidence regarding the risk of false
confessions, claiming that in most cases the misleading evidence will not 
cause an innocent suspect to confess guilt.197  But the situation is different
when the suspect is presented with scientific evidence that substantiates
his guilt unequivocally, because in this case even an innocent person can 
give up hope of proving his innocence and assent to the story being told 
by his interrogators.198 
When interrogators lie to suspects, telling them that their fingerprints or 
DNA samples were found at the scene of the incident, guilty persons are 
likely to believe that their crime was discovered, unless they can think up 
a reasonable explanation for their presence at the scene.  Whereas a guilty 
person who believes the lie knows that he cannot refute the evidence, an 
innocent person hopes that the error is revealed and corrected.199  It may
be, however, that an innocent suspect might feel he cannot cope with strong 
scientific evidence without the knowledge needed to uncover an error in 
testing. Some believe, therefore, that interrogators should be prohibited 
from lying about incriminating evidence that is perceived as infallible, and 
that can cause a reasonable innocent suspect, on some occasions, to think 
that conviction is inevitable.200 
The prohibition on forging an official document relies, inter alia, on the 
concern that innocent suspects will believe they cannot prove their innocence 
and, as a result, will make false confessions.  Whereas suspects are aware 
of their rivalry with their interrogators and treat their assertions with
suspicion, a document that was ostensibly issued by a reputable neutral agent
is viewed by the suspect as reliable.201 
However, although backing up a lie with documentation can strengthen 
its reliability in the eyes of the suspect, a lie voiced orally can also win the 
suspect’s trust.202  In both cases, the interrogator asks the suspect to trust 
197. See George C. Thomas III, Miranda’s Illusion: Telling Stories in the Police
Interrogation Room 81 TEX. L. REV. 1091, 1118 (2003) (reviewing WELSH S. WHITE,
MIRANDA’S WARNING PROTECTIONS: POLICE INTERROGATION PRACTICES AFTER DICKERSON
(2001)).
198. See id.
199. Thomas III, supra note 52, at 1295. 
200. See Gohara, supra note 4, at 822; Christine D. Salmon, DNA is Different:
Implications of the Public Perception of DNA Evidence on Police Interrogation Methods, 
11 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 51, 56–57 (2008) (proposing to prohibit interrogators from lying 
about the existence of DNA evidence); Thomas, supra note 34, at 1190. 
201. Morris, supra note 4, at 286–87 (citing Stave v. Cayward, 552 So. 2d 971, 974
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989)).
202. See Skolnick & Leo, supra note 4, at 8.
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the truthfulness of a false assertion, and to respond to it.  An oral lie can be 
even more dangerous, as it creates anxiety about conviction; whereas it is
possible to peruse a lie presented in writing and assess its strength, an oral 
lie is more vague and subject to the deceptions of memory.203  In any case, 
the assumption is that the suspect believes the interrogator about the existence
of incriminating evidence.204  If the suspect does not trust the interrogator, 
his decision on whether to confess is not affected by the incriminating 
evidence presented.  Suspects who assume that the interrogator can lie to 
them are either sufficiently sophisticated or have prior experience with police 
interrogations and, in any case, would tend to avoid collaborating with the
police.205 
Some argue that a reasonable innocent suspect is likely to feel he can
deal with false evidence that is not scientific; scientific evidence is perceived 
as more dangerous for the suspect than evidence based on a human source, 
such as a confession by an accomplice or identification in a lineup.206 
According to this line of thought, an innocent suspect would normally not
confess after an interrogator claims the suspect’s accomplice confessed to
the crime and implicated the suspect, but will instead believe that he can 
maintain his innocence, as the case comes down to his word against that 
of another person.207  Therefore, whereas lies concerning the existence of 
scientific evidence should be totally forsworn, other lies told concerning the 
incriminating evidence should be examined cautiously based on whether 
they can lead to false confessions.208 
However, in practice, every lie about incriminating evidence can lead
an innocent suspect to feel his conviction is inevitable.  It is possible that, 
if an innocent suspect believes that another person allegedly deflected the 
blame onto him, or if an eyewitness mistakenly identified him, he is likely
to fall victim to a false conviction.209  A lie about eyewitnesses implicating 
suspects led to the suspects in the infamous Central Park Jogger case to
 203. Id. 
204. Id. 
205. Id.
 206. Gohara, supra note 4, at 822–23 (citing Ofshe & Leo, supra note 64, at 1023); 
Welsh S. White, Miranda’s Failure to Restrain Pernicious Interrogation Practices, 99 MICH.
L. REV. 1211, 1243 (2001)). 
207. Thomas III, supra note 52, at 1302. 
208. White, supra note 141, at 137. 
209. Thomas, supra note 34, at 1197. 
 639
KITAI-SANGERO (DO NOT DELETE) 8/15/2018 10:42 AM     
 
 

























    
 
falsely confess about causing grievous bodily harm and committing rape.210 
A lie of this type can lead the suspect not only to make a false confession, 
but also provide the names of imagined accomplices and implicate them
in a crime they have not committed.211  This cause and effect is understandable.
Such a lie may cause the suspect to lose faith in the people close to him,
and can demolish his worldview and his faith in humanity.  A suspect’s 
“knowledge” that a person in whom he has faith betrayed his trust could 
bring a suspect to a state of emotional breakdown, and lead to a desire to
take revenge by implicating that person who allegedly betrayed his trust, 
out of frustration and rage.212  Besides, the suspect may want to do unto
others as they did unto him.  No wonder, then, that some recommend prohibiting
interrogators entirely from lying about incriminating evidence because of
the risk of false confessions.213 
Compare a neutral lie about incriminating evidence that does not implicate 
the suspect. An interrogator could, for example, lie to a suspected burglar 
that a house’s tenant is able to identify whoever robbed him.  The suspect 
might answer “that is impossible—the house was empty,” implicating his 
guilt without confessing.  Alternatively, an interrogator might lie that fingerprints 
were found at the scene, without explicitly stating the fingerprints are the 
suspect’s—the suspect might concede those are his fingerprints.  Such lies
on their face do not appear to produce false confessions or confessions 
prompted by emotional distress.  Likewise, there is no reason for an innocent 
suspect who is presented by the interrogator with a blood-stained shirt that 
was allegedly found at the scene of the crime to confess guilt when asked
if he knows anything about the shirt.214 
Assume, then, that the interrogator lies to the suspect that the laboratory
results regarding the DNA samples taken from the scene will soon become
available, and advises the suspect to tell the truth before the test results
arrive. A false statement that the interrogator is waiting for the laboratory
results does not create any hidden representations regarding the discovery
 210. Garett, supra note 133, at 1098 (citing Sydney H. Schanberg, A Journey Through 
the Tangled Case of the Central Park Jogger, VILLAGE VOICE (Nov. 19, 2002), https:// 
www.villagevoice.com/2002/11/19/a-journey-through-the-tangled-case-of-the-central-park­
jogger/ [https://perma.cc/R6C3-NYBE]); Wright, supra note 6, at 263 (citing Elaine Cassel, 
How to Stop False Confessions such as in the Central Park Jogger Case, CNN (Dec. 17,
2002, 12:42 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/12/17/findlaw.analysis.centralpark.jogger/ 
[https://perma.cc/EF4Y-V7VZ]).
211. See GUDJONSSON, supra note 56, at 17. 
212. See also Heyl, supra note 89, at 942. 
213. See Gohara, supra note 4, at 835; Kassin, Psychology of Confessions, supra note 18,
at 225. 
214. Thomas, supra note 34, at 1189, 1196. 
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of incriminating evidence against the suspect.215  An innocent suspect who 
believes the interrogator is likely to be reassured by this knowledge, because 
he is sure that there will be no match between his own DNA samples or
fingerprints and those obtained at the scene.216  He must even feel relieved 
at the prospect that scientific evidence will demonstrate his innocence.217 
And yet the intuition that neutral lies do not propel false confessions 
does not match reality.  Kassin gives an example of a suspect who confessed
to murdering his wife after nineteen hours of interrogation, and after the 
interrogator told him that blood was found in his car, which was sent to
the laboratory to obtain a DNA sample.218  The suspect made a false confession, 
explaining later that he was exhausted by the interrogation and thought 
that the DNA test would in any case prove his innocence.219  Another suspect 
also confessed to rape and murder after six hours of interrogation, after
being told that a DNA sample had been taken from the scene, certain that 
the DNA test would prove his innocence.220 A DNA sample was truly taken 
from the scene, and it did not match the suspect’s DNA.221  But despite
the discrepancy, the suspect was prosecuted based on his confession, convicted, 
and exonerated sixteen years later, after investigators matched the DNA 
obtained at the scene of the crime and the DNA of another person.222 
Studies that have examined how a statement about the existence of 
evidence that has not been reviewed affects the decision to confess found, 
surprisingly, that such statements increase the risk of false confessions.223 
In an experiment similar to the Alt key scenario, a group of participants 
215. Note that in Germany, the ban on lying extends also to truthful statements that 
are liable to create a misconception on the part of the suspect about the existence of 
incriminating evidence.  Ross, supra note 77, at 457.  This includes a statement by the 
interrogator to the suspect, when taking his fingerprints, that he now has the opportunity
to confess, because such a statement could cause suspects to mistakenly conclude that a
match has been found between his fingerprints and those taken at the scene of the crime. 
Id.
216. Thomas III, supra note 52, at 1301. 
217. Khasin, supra note 4, at 1041. 
218. Kassin, Psychology of Confessions, supra note 18, at 224. 
219. Id.; Jennifer T. Perillo & Saul M. Kassin, Inside Interrogation: The Lie, the 
Bluff, and False Confessions, 35 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 327, 328–29 (2011). 
220.  Perillo & Kassin, supra note 219, at 329 (quoting Fernanda Santos, DNA Evidence 




 223. Id. at 330–31. 
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was told that the computer was connected to a server that documented 
each keystroke, and that when the experimenter was able to get the password 
to the server from the experiment’s organizer, she could actually check 
whether the Alt key was pressed.224 Surprisingly, the rate of false confessions
that occurred under this scenario was even higher than the one wherein
the subject was confronted with an actual lie about someone watching 
them touch the Alt key with the tip of their finger.225  The neutral lie, which 
did not cause people to modify their belief as to their guilt, was sufficiently
strong to trigger false confessions.226  Seventy-five percent of those who
confessed cited the bluff as a reason for the confession,227 probably out of 
belief that the confession would not prevent their exoneration.228 
In a different study, each pair of students was asked to answer questions, 
some of them together, and some individually.229  In the “guilty” group, 
one of the pair, who was a collaborator, sought help from his partner in 
answering an individual question.230  In the “innocent” group none of the
participants spoke with one another.231  Afterwards, the participants were
told that they and their confederate were suspected of violating the academic
institution’s honor code because of their answers’ similarity to one of the 
individual questions.232  The participants were then asked to sign a confession.233 
In this case, the accused participants were necessarily aware of whether 
they assisted their partner in answering the question. The results showed 
a significant difference between the confession rates—approximately ninety 
percent of the students confessed when they were in the guilty group (where 
the confederate asked for help), whereas approximately twenty-seven
percent of the students confessed when they were part of the innocent
group (where the students did not talk to each other).234  Some of the accused 
participants were told that a camera placed in the adjacent room had filmed
the course of the examination, and that the video technician, who was 
expected to arrive in a few hours, would retrieve the data from the hard disk.235 
The lie significantly affected guilty participants into making confessions, 
224. Id. at 330. 
225. Id. at 330, 330 tbl.1.  Table one shows that false evidence provided a 78.57% 
false confession rate, whereas bluff provided an 86.67% false confession rate. 
226. Id. at 330 tbl.1, 331. 
227. Id. at 332.  However, three participants who did not confess also explained their
refusal to confess by the knowledge that their innocence would be revealed. Id. at 332. 
228. Id.
 229. Id. at 332–33. 
230. Id. at 333. 
231. Id. 
232. Id.
 233. Id. at 333–34. 
234. Id. at 334. 
235. Id. at 333. 
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as opposed to guilty participants who were not exposed to the lie, but it
also significantly sparked confessions of guilt by innocent participants.236 
Fifty percent of innocent participants who were exposed to the lie confessed, 
as opposed to those who were not exposed to the lie, where none admitted
their guilt.237  Eighty-eight percent of innocent participants who confessed 
and seventy-five percent of innocent participants who declined to admit
guilt explained that the existence of the camera was a pivotal factor in
their decision; those who admitted assumed that their innocence would 
soon become apparent anyway, and those who declined to admit were 
strengthened in their knowledge that they would be cleared after the facts 
were checked.238  The trust that the innocent confessors demonstrate in 
clearing their name after the evidence is tested is compatible with a more 
general phenomenon of innocent suspects who do not treat an out-of-court 
confession as significant, out of belief that the criminal justice system will
expose the truth.239 
These experiments showed that lies of any type regarding the existence
of incriminating evidence can push false confessions, and that they are 
also sufficiently strong means to extract confessions from guilty persons. 
The lie’s net catches many guilty suspects as well as a considerable number 
of innocent ones.  If intelligent suspects, who had not been subjected to 
the pressures of police interrogation, admitted quite easily to cheating during 
an examination, one can only imagine the potential effect of lies during 
police interrogation, let alone during custodial interrogation, on a suspect’s
inclination to confess.240  The chances that an innocent person would confess
after being confronted with lies regarding the incriminating evidence are
greater than those of an innocent person making a confession without such 
lies.241  The very presentation of false evidence is fatal to the decision of 
suspects to confess; they shape their version of events in light of the false
evidence out of belief that they have no escape from conviction or that the 
truth comes out and clears them anyway.242
 236. Id. at 334. 
237. Id.
 238. Id.
 239. See DAVID WOLCHOVER & HEATON ARMSTRONG, ON CONFESSION EVIDENCE 93
(1996); Kassin, Inside Interrogation, supra note 142, at 537. 
240. On the general effects of custodial interrogations, see Covey, supra note 78, at
1886. 
241. Saul M. Kassin, The Psychology of Confession Evidence, 52 AM. PSYCHOL. 221,
230 (1997). 
242. Id. at 225. 
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The following two sections clarify why lies about the incriminating
evidence violate the fundamental Fifth Amendment right of suspects to 
remain silent during interrogations. 
E. Curtailing the Freedom of Choice 
Lies in general might hurt a person’s ability to choose and make decisions
based on relevant information.243  As demonstrated in numerous studies, 
a person’s beliefs can alter their perception of reality.244  The offense of deceit,
providing false information on medical treatment and fraud in connection 
with contracts, is perceived as undermining the ability to choose.245 
Likewise, lies during interrogation harm a suspect’s ability to make decisions 
by distorting the information at their disposal and changing their cost-
benefit evaluation of confessing.246  To the extent that the suspect feels 
that he has no choice but to confess given the incriminating evidence against 
him, his ability to withstand the pressures of the interrogation is weakened.247 
In Germany, the approach is therefore that the suspect’s autonomy to choose
silence is compromised if the police feed him misinformation.248 
Consequently, lies undermine the suspect’s right to silence.  Silence is 
a defense strategy.  A defendant is entitled to plan his defense strategy, not 
just by offering his own version of events, but by pointing out the weaknesses
and flaws in the prosecution’s case.249  A suspect is also entitled to plan
his defense by remaining silent on the assumption that the incriminating
evidence against him is weak.250  Silence in the face of weak evidence is
a reasonable defense strategy, based on the assumption that the prosecution 
would fail to meet the high burden of proof required for a conviction.251
 243. BOK, supra note 36, at 22; Young, supra note 2, at 469. 
244. See Perillo & Kassin, supra note 219, at 327–28. 
245. See Young, supra note 2, at 470. 
246. Amelia Courtney Hritz, Note, “Voluntariness with a Vengeance”: the Coerciveness
of Police Lies in Interrogations 102 CORNELL L. REV. 487, 497–98 (2017) (citing BOK, 
supra note 36, at 19–20). 
247. Id.
 248. Ross, supra note 77, at 453; see also Roppé, supra note 96, at 768 (“This right 
to choose silence is a nullity if interrogators subject the suspect to tactics which disable 
her from appreciating the significance or consequences of a self-incriminating statement.”)
249. Rinat Kitai-Sangero & Yuval Merin, Probing into Salinas’s Silence: Back to 
the “Accused Speaks” Model?, 15 NEV. L.J. 77, 103 (2014). 
250. John H. Langbein, The Historical Origins of the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination at Common Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1047, 1070 (1994) (stating that the high
burden of proof required for conviction “encouraged defense counsel to silence the defendant 
and hence to insist that the prosecution case be built from other proofs”). 
251. See Divya Sukumar et al., Behind Closed Doors: Live Observations of Current
Police Station Disclosure Practices and Lawyer-Client Consultations, 2016 CRIM. L.R.
900, 912 (2017) [hereinafter Sukumar et al., Behind Closed Doors] (stating that when the 
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An innocent suspect might implicate himself during interrogation if he 
chooses to make a statement because of his proximity to the event or because 
of forgetfulness, lack of concentration, and stress.252  Silence can increase 
his chances of being acquitted or of not being charged in the first place.
By contrast, during the interrogation, when the suspect is “persuaded” that
the incriminating evidence against him is strong, abandoning silence can
be a logical step, based on the assumption that without providing his own 
version of events to counter the evidence there is no chance of avoiding
being brought to justice.  Lying about incriminating evidence violates, therefore, 
the individual’s right to remain silent by misrepresenting the benefit of 
exercising this right, and is liable to damage the chances of a suspect, whether
guilty or innocent, to avoid indictment, trial, and conviction.
F. Curtailing the Obligation to Prove Guilt
In the verdict acquitting Mark Kuznetsov of the charges of murder, the 
Tel Aviv District Court in Israel described the dynamics that led the
defendant to make a false confession during the interrogation, citing excerpts 
from conversations between the accused and the jailhouse snitches.  One 
of the jailhouse snitches asked “So what you want to write? Admit your
guilt?”  The defendant replied “Yes,” and added “That I didn’t kill him is
certain.”  The defendant gave the same response in an answer to the question 
of another jailhouse snitch, “I didn’t act in self-defense. I never touched
him. . .  I know I didn’t touch, but there is something, that person, who testified. . . 
that I cut. . . all is built on this, plus my fingerprints.”  The defendant also 
explained “I have no way of proving that I didn’t commit murder.”253 
These conversations reflect the sense of despair in which innocent suspects
find themselves when facing their inability to refute the false incriminating 
evidence against them.  Suspects are not exposed to the police’s evidence.
They are asked by their interrogators to provide their story in response to 
a false version.  Lies prevent suspects from addressing the real incriminating 
evidence against them during the interrogation, from requiring that the 
evidence disclosed by the police is not strong, solicitors in England advise their clients to 
remain silent). 
252. Rinat Kitai-Sangero, Respecting the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination: A Call for
Providing Miranda Warnings in Non-Custodial Interrogations, 42 N.M. L. REV. 203, 230
(2012).
253.  File No. 1172/04 DC (TA), State of Israel v. Kuznetzov (Dec. 12, 2005), Nevo 
Legal Database (by subscription, in Hebrew) (Isr.).
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police carry out forensic tests, and from seeking methods of inquiry that
could prove their innocence.254 
At trial, in the adversarial system, the prosecution’s case is presented
before hearing the defense.255  The first narrative being presented enjoys
a psychological advantage because people tend to adopt a position on the 
basis of it, and feel that the first narrative has become “theirs.”256 But the
party presenting second has a great advantage in the fact that the obligation 
to prove the assertions rests on the first party, and the second party has the 
opportunity to respond to this version and refute it.257 
Imagine that the prosecution’s witness testifies at trial to having seen
the defendant stab the victim with a knife.  Forensics testifies that the defendant’s
fingerprints were found on the knife used in the stabbing.  Considering 
such overwhelming evidence, the defendant abandons the defense.  But it 
turns out that the prosecution intentionally used false witness testimony
to make it almost impossible for the defendant to cope with the evidence 
and consequently force him into admitting guilt.  This situation is obviously 
absurd. Perjury is a criminal offense.  Misrepresentation of evidence at trial 
by state agents is strictly prohibited.258 
Some might say that a crucial difference exists between defense at trial
and making statements during police interrogations.  In court, the defendant 
is entitled to cross-examine the prosecution’s witnesses.  If witnesses perjure
themselves, the defendant will waste resources such as time and money cross- 
examining false witnesses. He will bring an expert on his behalf to examine
fingerprints which are not his.  In contrast, during the interrogation, the suspect 
does not present evidence and does not cross-examine witnesses.  He only
presents his version of events to the interrogator. 
But it is possible to argue that even at trial the presentation of false 
evidence would undermine the confidence of the guilty defendant and lead
her to plead guilty.  If the defendant does not admit her guilt at the end of 
the prosecution’s case, the prosecution can declare at this point that it presented
false evidence and indemnify the defendant for the funds she spent to contend
with it. Obviously, no legal system recognizes such a scenario.
 254. See Ross, supra note 77, at 454. 
255. Gary Goodpaster, On the Theory of American Adversary Criminal Trial, 78 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 118, 121 (1987).
256. G.O.W. Mueller, The Position of the Criminal Defendant in the United States of
America, in THE ACCUSED 87, 116 (J.A. Coutts ed., 1966); Nunn, supra note 121, at 789, 
792. 
257. See Nunn, supra note 121, at 798. 
258. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 757 (1970). 
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During the investigation stage, the interrogators are not required to disclose
incriminating evidence to a suspect.259  Withholding evidence does not
constitute a lie. Thus, interrogators may eschew disclosure so the suspect
cannot concoct a story that fits the evidence presented,260 and to help them
identify inconsistencies between the evidence and the suspect’s recollection.261 
Furthermore, it is possible to argue that, even if the police had an obligation 
to disclose incriminating evidence, such evidence is still fluid and changes 
during investigation.  The purpose of the investigation is to gather evidence. 
It is not possible to put the cart before the horse.  Although a certain level of
suspicion is required to turn an individual into a suspect,262 interrogators are
not expected during the interrogation, especially in its early stages, to have 
evidence that establishes the suspect’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Interrogators can also make mistakes regarding existing incriminating 
evidence against the suspect.  Consider a suspect identified in a lineup. 
The police communicate this fact to the suspect.  Under the pressure exerted 
by the strength of the evidence, the suspect admits to the crime, or alternatively
invents a false alibi. Later, the interrogators receive information that the 
identifying witness was not at the scene of the crime and that he has a
motive to falsely implicate the suspect.  They reach the conclusion that 
they cannot rely on the identification that was made.  In another case, the 
police may make a mistake tracking the whereabouts of the suspect on the 
day of the offense.  The interrogators tell the suspect that the tracking proves
his presence at the scene of the crime.  The suspect confesses due to this 
honest error. 
In the adversarial system, bearing the obligation to prove the accusations,
the prosecution is first to present its evidence, allowing the defendant to 
address and refute it.  Indeed, as noted, at the interrogation phase, no duty
 259. Ross, supra note 77, at 457; Sukumar et al., Strategic Disclosure, supra note 153, at
307. 
260. Sukumar et al., Behind Closed Doors, supra note 251, at 903 (citing Ed Cape, 
Transposing the EU Directive on the Right to Information: A Firecracker or a Damp Squib?, 
2015 CRIM. L. REV. 48, 58–59); Sukumar et al., How the Timing of Police Evidence Disclosure
Impacts Custodial Legal Advice, 20 INT’L J. EVIDENCE & PROOF 200, 200 (2016) [hereinafter 
Sukumar et al., Timing of Police Evidence Disclosure].
261. Sukumar et al., Behind Closed Doors, supra note 251, at 903 (citing Cape, supra
note 260, at 58–59). 
262. Interrogations should be based on probable cause, according to which the facts 
and circumstances of the case are sufficient to justify a reasonable person’s belief that the 
suspect committed the offense attributed to him. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S.
200, 216 (1979); Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 91 (1964) (citing Henry v. United States, 361
U.S. 98, 102 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949)). 
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is imposed on the interrogators to disclose incriminating evidence to the 
suspect. But one ought not to expect suspects to justify themselves and
prove their innocence, if they cannot address the incriminating evidence against 
them.  Thus, solicitors in England tend to advise their clients to exercise 
their right to silence during interrogations when police do not disclose 
their evidence.263  An accused person’s defense is damaged if he cannot provide
explanations, even at the interrogation phase, for incriminating evidence
held by the police.  Through lies, police interrogators not only deprive the 
suspect the possibility of addressing the true incriminating evidence, but 
also force him to shape a defense to rebut fake evidence and push him to
conclude there is no point in denying guilt or remaining silent.  As opposed 
to the presentation of accurate evidence or of unintentionally inaccurate
evidence, presentation of fake evidence is tantamount to perjury. 
IV. CONCLUSION
The constitutional protections of Miranda ought to extend to bar the use 
of lies concerning incriminating evidence against suspects, aimed at extracting 
confessions. Lies concerning incriminating evidence force suspects to 
provide their version of events without knowledge of the true facts, and to 
shape their defense based on false evidence.  They assume guilt, do not allow
suspects to respond intelligently to the accusation leveled against them, and 
create the false impression that remaining silent is futile.  Consequently, 
such lies violate the fundamental principles of constitutional criminal
law—imposition of the obligation to prove the accusations on the state,
the presumption of innocence, and the Fifth Amendment right to remain
silent. They increase the risk of suspects becoming entangled in lies and
making false confessions, resulting in false convictions. 
263. Sukumar et al., Strategic Disclosure, supra note 153, at 309 (citing Katie Quinn 
& John Jackson, Of Rights and Roles: Police Interviews with Young Suspects in Northern 
Ireland, 47 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 234, 241 (2007)); see Sukumar et al., Behind Closed 
Doors, supra note 251, at 902 (citing Sukumar et al., Timing of Police Evidence Disclosure, 
supra note 260, at 206–09). Indeed, pre-interview disclosure is a common practice in 
England, though the disclosure is not necessarily full.  Id. at 907–08. 
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